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The Use of Force
Against Perpetrators
of International
Terrorism
Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi†
ABSTRACT:
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), emerged in 2014
from a faction of Al-Qaeda and captured portion of territories of
Iraq and Syria. Since then, it has generated serious threats to the
security of the United States and European, Asian, and Middle
Eastern countries. In response, the threatened states have the
right to use force in self-defense as guaranteed by Article 51 of the
UN Charter. However, uncertainties arise related to the legality
of the use of force against ISIS, because the stronger factions of
this group are residing in Syrian territory and military
operations by the U.S. against ISIS will imply the use of force
within Syrian territory, which may constitute an infringement of
its sovereignty. Nonetheless, the sovereignty of the Syrian state
has already been violated when ISIS captured part of Syria.
Furthermore, Syria has also failed to fulfill its responsibility to
protect its citizens from grave human rights violations committed
by ISIS. This leads to the possibility that the Syrian state might
be unwilling or unable to counter and terminate the ISIS threat.
Hence, this situation invites the application of the “unwilling or
unable test” to justify the use of force against ISIS within Syrian
territory; however, the legality of this consequence is arguable
and uncertain. Furthermore, the UN Charter also does not
provide guidance regarding an armed conflict between a nonstate actor, i.e., ISIS, and a state, i.e., the United States, within
another state, i.e., in Syria. Therefore, if the threat is still
overlooked by the UN or the international community, then there
are chances that the threat-affected states may become involved
in proxy wars for the protection of their security and interests.
Keywords: Article 51, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), nonstate
actors (NSA), self-defense, use of force, unwilling or unable test.
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INTRODUCTION

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of
December 9, 1985, “[u]nequivocally condemns all acts, methods,
and practices of terrorism wherever and by whoever committed
including those which jeopardize friendly relations among states
and their security.”1 However, there is confusion in international
law concerning the use of force in response to an armed terrorist
attack waged by a non-state actor against one state from the
territory of another state. The terrorist assaults by ISIS on EU
countries and other regions are the most recent examples of
such an armed terrorist attack. ISIS occupied Mosul, border
regions of Syria, and almost the entirety of northern Iraq in
June 2014 and has developed a rudimentary governance system
in the territories it has captured in the Levant.2 Its pursuit to
gain control and use force is much more extreme than anything
ever before exhibited by other jihadist groups, and it poses a
major threat to regional as well as international peace and
security.3
The UN Charter clearly recognizes the inherent right of
states’ individual or collective self-defense. The right of selfdefense is inherent in natural law 4 and is limited by the
customary
principles
of
imminence,
necessity,
and
proportionality. It is regulated by Article 51 of the Charter.5
However, if a state is attacked by non-state actors
operating from another state, then this restricts the use of force
in self-defense for the victim state until the other state fulfills
its state responsibility. As per the principle of state
responsibility, not only are all states required to protect their
own citizens from human rights violations and atrocities of nonstate actors, but they are also under an obligation to ensure that
no armed threat from their territory is launched by such nonstate actors against other states.6
G.A. Res. 40/61, ¶ 1 (Dec. 9, 1985).
MALCOLM RUSSELL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA 163 (48th ed. 2014).
3 ANDERS JÄGERSKOG & ASHOK SWAIN, EMERGING SECURITY THREATS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 23-24 (2016).
4 DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-152 (1958);
see also Anthony D’Amato, Israel’s Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor,
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 584-585, 584 (1983); see also: ADEMOLA ABASS, REGIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 129 (2004).
5 MURRAY
C. ALDER, THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (2013).
6 Int’l Law Comm’n. Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/49, at 2 (2001),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf.
1
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The United States launched airstrikes against al-Qaeda
and ISIS targets in Syria but it is pertinent to mention that the
US was never asked by the Syrian government to attack those
non-state actors in its territory. As far as the airstrikes on Iraq
are concerned, they are justified because the Iraqi government
itself asked for military intervention to tackle the threat of nonstate actors in its territory. So the military operations in Syria
were not legal because they lacked the consent of the Syrian
government and were not even approved by the UN Security
Council.
This Article argues that the unwilling or unable rationale
does not fulfill the standard conditions of right of self-defense
and concludes that said rationale is a new norm of jus ad bellum
in the making and is the best option for the victim state in order
to combat non-state actors.7
This Article will set out the complexities related to the
legal frameworks for the use of force against non-state actors. In
this regard, the first section of this Article will set out the threat
posed by ISIS to the United States and, more particularly,
Europe in the wake of recent terror attacks by ISIS in Paris and
other EU cities. The inadequacy of international law in defining
possible countermeasures to protect states from ISIS and
similar terrorist groups will be discussed in the second section,
along with the responsibilities applied by international law on
every sovereign state. The third section includes an elaboration
of humanitarian law, and the fourth section includes an
explanation of the recently emerged “unwilling or unable test
framework” and an application of it to ISIS.
II.

THE ISIS THREAT
A.

Emergence of ISIS

In chaos-stricken Syria in 2014, Al-Qaeda’s rival jihadi
group, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also called
ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), 8 managed to
capture a significant portion of territory in Syria and established
a capital at al-Raqqah. 9 The same year, in June, it occupied
lands in Northern Iraq and Syria and, then, developed a
Hereinafter “non-state actor(s)” will shorthand referred to as NSA(s).
JOHN MUELLER & MARK STEWART, CHASING GHOSTS: THE POLICING OF
TERRORISM 45 (2016).
9 CHARLES CARIS & SAMUEL REYNOLDS, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE
E. SEC. REP. 22- ISIS GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA 4 (2014).
7
8
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makeshift rule in the territories it captured in the Levant
region.10 The representativeness of this new “government” is a
matter of immense debate, especially considering the fact that
the group primarily uses force to gain territory.
ISIS operates under a doctrine of total war, often
engaging in beheadings and gruesome murders. 11 In this
context, it is morally and legally permissible for the
international community to respond to the massive violations of
human rights committed by ISIS. While the Iraqi government
itself has sought help from the international community,
external intervention in Syria seems quite problematic. 12 The
two main arguments that the proponents of intervention
advance are based on the premise that action in Syria is
necessary for the collective self-defense of Iraq, Syria, and the
U.S. from the threats posed by ISIS.13 Furthermore, in contexts
such as this, the “responsibility to protect” may be invoked to
safeguard the citizens of Syria, Iraq, and connected Levant
regions from facing violations of human rights. Since 2012, Syria
has seen approximately 400,000 deaths, 14 half of which have
been in 2014, indicating the high magnitude of human rights
violations that have occurred in this region in a very short
tenure. 15 The majority of these atrocities have allegedly been
committed by ISIS, which in total has up to an estimated 30,000
militants.16
With such a high number of trained and armed terrorists,
ISIS is disseminating chaos and fear in the Levant region and
challenging the very authority of the Iraqi and Syrian
governments, and is planning to extend this fear toward
Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC (Oct. 21,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.
11 JESSICA STERN & J. M. BERGER. ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR (2015).
12 HELEN
DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (2015).
13 DAVID FRENCH, JAY SEKULOW, JORDAN SEKULOW, & ROBERT W. ASH, RISE
OF ISIS: A THREAT WE CAN'T IGNORE (2014).
14 John Hudson, U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000, FOREIGN
POLICY (Apr. 22, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revisessyria-death-toll-to-400000/.
15 RAMESH THAKUR & WILLIAM MALEY, THEORISING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT, 169 (2015).
16 HANS BINNENDIJK, FRIENDS, FOES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: U.S.
PARTNERSHIPS IN A TURBULENT WORLD, 100-150 (Rand Corporation, 2016);
see also Richard Norton, Up To 30,000 Foreign Fighters Have Gone to Syria
and Iraq Since 2011 – Report, GUARDIAN (November 17, 2015),
http://www.Theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/20000-foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-2014-terrorism-report.
10

16:1

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

6

America and European countries.17 It has claimed responsibility
for the terror attacks in Paris,18 Istanbul, and Ankara,19 and at
Brussels Airport, 20 which took place in 2016 and caused the
deaths of several innocent civilians. In addition to threatening
non-Muslim states with hostile circumstances detrimental to
their peace and security, it has also issued threats to Muslim21
states who do not submit to ISIS’s ideology.
B.

Threat to International Peace and Security

As mentioned above, ISIS is a threat not just to Syria and
Iraq (and their people) but also to the global community22 and
thus armed intervention against ISIS in the Levant will simply
be an exercise in self-defense. ISIS has issued threats related to
launching direct attacks on the international community. ISIS
leader Al-Adnani uploaded a video speech that included a direct
threat:
O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State
did not initiate a war against you, as your governments
and media try to make you believe.… You will pay the
price when your economies collapse. You will pay the
price when your sons are sent to wage war against us
and they return to you as disabled amputees, or inside
coffins, or mentally ill. You will pay the price as you are
afraid of traveling to any land.… You will not feel secure
even in your bedrooms. You will pay the price when this
crusade of yours collapses, and thereafter we will strike
you in your homeland, and you will never be able to
harm anyone afterwards. You will pay the price, and we
have prepared for you what will pain you.23

In another instance, he directed his subordinates to launch
attacks on European and American civilians as well as on other
countries:
DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE 20 (2016).
ERSEL AYDINLI, VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS: FROM ANARCHISTS TO
JIHADISTS 145 (2016).
19 DENIZ EROGLU, IBRAHIM SIRKECI, & JEFFREY COHEN, TURKISH MIGRATION
2016 SELECTED PAPERS 280 (Eroglu et al. eds. 2016).
20 DAVID ORLO, THE JERUSALEM PROTOCOL (2016).
21 TAMARA SONN, ISLAM: HISTORY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS 178 (2016).
22 French, supra note 13; see also Kinga Tibori-Szabó, The ‘Unwilling or
Unable’ Test and the Law of Self-defense, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 94 (Christophe Paulussen, Ben Van
Rompuy, Tamara Takács, & Vesna Lazi eds., 2015).
23 ROBERT SPENCER, THE COMPLETE INFIDEL'S GUIDE TO ISIS, Chpt. 2 (2015).
17
18
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If you can kill a disbelieving American or European,
especially the spiteful and filthy French, or an
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from
the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the
countries that entered into a coalition against the
Islamic State [ISIS], then rely upon Allah, and kill him
in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for
anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the
disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they
have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers.…
Both of their blood and wealth is legal for you to destroy,
for blood does not become illegal or legal to spill by the
clothes being worn.24

In response to the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, Al-Adnani reissued the warning to the United States by stating that it would
be the last campaign of the United States because it would not
survive after the campaign. 25 He also threatened to raid the
United States after the operation against ISIS:
[W]e will raid you thereafter, and you will never raid
us.26

These speeches point toward the direct threat that looms over
the citizens of America, Europe, the Levant, and other countries,
as is evident from the recent attacks by ISIS in Paris, Ankara,
Istanbul, and other cities, which claimed the lives of many
civilians, further indicating how deeply the ISIS threat has
penetrated into European countries.
Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention here that ISIS
spreads terror worldwide by using the internet, i.e., it uploads
terrifying videos of its barbaric atrocities on public forums, e.g.,
YouTube, to terrorize the masses.27 It uploaded the videos of the
beheadings of American journalists Steven Sotloff and James
Foley in August and September 2014, the setting on fire and
killing of Jordanian Air Force pilot Moath Kasasbeh, and the
HASSAN HASSAN & MICHAEL WEISS, ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR 263
(2016); see also BRIGITTE NACOS, TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 28
(2016); see also JOHN STAPLETON, TERROR IN AUSTRALIA: WORKERS' PARADISE
LOST (2015).
25 Id.; see also DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD 241 (2015).
26 Id.
27 MAJEED KHADER, COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN
THE DIGITAL ERA 34 (2016); see also MALCOLM NANCE, DEFEATING ISIS: WHO
THEY ARE, HOW THEY FIGHT, WHAT THEY BELIEVE 384 (2016).
24
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execution of Japanese journalist Kenji Goto, 28 as well as the
enslaving and selling of Iraqi children, the killings of Muslim
scholars who refused to submit to ISIS leaders, the abduction
and rape of girls in Syria and Iraq, and the killings of nonMuslims and Shias in the Levant region after kidnapping and
torturing them; yet these are only some of the instances of
inhuman brutality of ISIS. 29 ISIS also uses social networking
websites including Twitter and Facebook to promote its specific
hashtags for spreading terror. Such actions have terrified the
global international community as the threats are not targeted
to a specific country but to all of the international community.30
The question arises here is whether international law
actually permits the use of force against an NSA, i.e., ISIS,
within or near the territory of another sovereign state, i.e.,
Syria? A number of contemporary scholars and policymakers
contend that, since the rules on the use of force in the United
Nations Charter are inadequate to deal with today’s problems,
particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the use of force
becomes necessary in certain instances as a self-defense
mechanism.31 Nonetheless, it is a matter of fact that the U.S.
and other countries can play an important role in preventing
attacks from ISIS and in curbing the ISIS threat permanently
by sharing intelligence and using force against ISIS as it will
directly harm its power.32 Deeming this to be anticipatory and
preventive self-defense and working in response, the U.S. and
some other EU countries including Turkey, France, the U.K.,
and Russia have started launching counterattacks on ISIS in
the Syrian border regions.33 However, the counterattacks have
not diminished the threat posed by ISIS,34 probably because of
the fact that the counterattacks are not as forceful as they ought
to be or perhaps owing to the restrictions and limitations from
SHAKIRA HUSSEIN, FROM VICTIMS TO SUSPECTS: MUSLIM WOMEN SINCE 9/11
(2016); see also SAMI MOUBAYED, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: AT THE FRONTIER
OF THE NEW JIHAD 137 (2015).
29 Eliza Griswold, Is This the End of Christianity in The Middle East?, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2015).
30 MARK WHEELER & PETROS IOSIFIDIS, PUBLIC SPHERES AND MEDIATED
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE WESTERN CONTEXT AND BEYOND 273 (2016).
31 Samantha Arrington Sliney, Right to Act: United States Legal Basis Under
the Law of Armed Conflict to Pursue the Islamic State in Syria, 6 U. MIAMI
NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 2-3, 23 (2015).
32 ARNOLD SCHUCHTER, ISIS CONTAINMENT & DEFEAT (2015).
33 THAKUR, supra note 15, 169.
34 HABIB TILIOUINE, THE STATE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES:
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 199 (Richard
Estes ed., 2016).
28
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international law in approving and endorsing such
counterattacks.35 Therefore, this paper will look to explore and
explain the justifications for the use of force against ISIS in the
Levant region, particularly in Syria.
III.

ARMED ATTACK AND THE USE OF FORCE
A.

Armed Attack

In order to evaluate whether the threats and terrorist
attacks from ISIS qualify as an armed attack, we will first
clarify the definition of an armed attack. In this regard,
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which were passed by the United
Nations Security Council in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks, define
armed attack in following words:
[The] large-scale attacks by non-state actors can
qualify as “armed attacks” within the meaning of Article
51.36

In this context, the threats from ISIS against the United States
and other countries can be considered threats of armed attacks.
Furthermore, the recent terrorist attacks conducted by ISIS in
European countries can actually be regarded as large-scale
attacks, because they resulted in the killings of significant
numbers of people and caused huge financial losses to the
damaged and attacked areas. 37 Therefore, such large-scale
armed attacks are paving the way toward a perpetual armed
conflict between ISIS NSAs and the states of Europe and
America.
The aforementioned resolutions of the United Nations
also endorse the rights to use force to respond to such armed
attacks. In this regard, Resolution 1368 further endorses the
targeted use of force against any entity—whether a state or nonstate group—involved in promoting or harboring the armed

JULIAN RUDOLPH & KYLE HACKEL, POLITIGUIDE 2016: UNDERSTAND THE
ISSUES, STAY INFORMED, JOIN THE DISCUSSION, EMPOWER YOURSELF 63
(2016).
36 See S. C. Res. 1368 (Sep. 12, 2001); see also MICHAEL SCHARF, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 209 (2013); see also
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 374 (Pierre
Hauck & Sven Peterke eds., 2016).
37 ANDREW
FIALA & BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 529 (2016).
35

16:1

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

10

attacks.38 A military operation against the involved characters
would be recognized as an act of self-defense by the victim state
for countering the terrorist threat. 39 However, this does not
imply that the UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373 endorse unilateral
attacks by one state against a group of NSAs residing within the
territory of another state. 40 Furthermore, nothing in these
resolutions suggests that a unilaterally decided action of use of
force by a state would be recognized as a universally acceptable
and legitimate action; 41 there have been examples in recent
history in which the use of force by a state against an NSA in
the territory of another state was not approved by the United
Nations Security Council. For instance, the use of force by Israel
in Syrian territory in 2003 to destroy a Palestinian armed
group’s training center was denounced by the UN Security
Council despite the fact that Israel presented a self-defense
argument against that armed group. 42 This indicates that a
state has to take into consideration the international bodies,
among which the United Nations Security Council is the most
esteemed, whose endorsement of the “use of force” against a
state or NSAs will be considered universally acceptable and
legally approved. This has become a norm in customary
international law for justifying the use of force against another
state or against an NSA in another state.43 The attack against
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 is an application of this
norm.44
On the other hand, it is pertinent to mention, here, that
many scholars argue that the use of force in self-defense
pursuant to Article 51 does not require the approval of the
Security Council. Rather, as scholars further argue, states can
use their inherent right to self-defense without the approval of
any international body, including the UN Security Council,
because there is nothing in the language of Article 51 that
requires states to gain approval from any international body
prior to exercising their right of self-defense. 45 As the
Id.
KIMBERLEY TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
59 (2011).
40 COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE 122 (Colleen Lewis
& Jenny Hocking eds., 2007) [hereinafter COUNTER-TERRORISM].
41 Id.
42 TRAPP, supra note 39, at 58.
43 AFRICA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 92 (Dan Kuwali & Frans
Viljoen eds., 2013).
44 Id.; see also NIGEL WHITE, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 41 (2014).
45 YASSIN EL-AYOUTY, PERSPECTIVES ON 9/11 57 (2004).
38
39
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted in the Nicaragua
case:46
There is nothing in the language of the Article 51
that prevents the victim state from exercising its inherent
right to self-defence.47

Hence, if a victim state wants to unilaterally exercise its right to
self-defense by waging a military operation against NSAs
residing in another state that may or may not sponsor the NSA,
then the use of force against the NSA by the victim state should
be recognized as in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter
and therefore regarded as a legitimate action.48
However, despite this provision, the UN Security Council
intervenes in order to evaluate the legitimacy of any unilateral
attack waged by a victim state against another state. This is
done in order to prevent any victim state from becoming an
aggressor, because the UN Charter does not allow any state to
act in a similar manner. Therefore, gaining approval from the
UN Security Council for the use of force acts as a criterion for
legitimizing the use of force, in addition to Article 51 of the UN
Charter and on the basis of self-defense.49 While adhering to the
aforementioned normative practice, a state can use force against
another state that is harboring terrorism or against the NSAs
that have gained control over an independent or sovereign
territory, if the use of force is in accordance with exercising the
inherent right of self-defense.50
B.

The Use of Force in International Law
1.

Uncertainty in International Law

International law does not give clear guidance on the
recommended and suitable action in a situation of armed conflict
between a state and a non-state group residing in another
state’s territory. This makes it challenging to adjudicate
whether the use of force in self-defense by state X against a nonLARISSA VAN DEN HERIK & NICO SCHRIJVER, COUNTER-TERRORISM
STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 288 (2015).
47 See TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE, 484 (2010); see also ANNYSSA
BELLAL, THE WAR REPORT: ARMED CONFLICT IN 2014 402 (2016).
48 Id.
49 AFRICA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 43, at 92.
50 BELINDA HELMKE, UNDER ATTACK 44 (2016).
46
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state group residing in state Y is legally justifiable. As a result,
we also need to identify if state Y is a weak or failed state that
cannot control the NSAs from their violent activities or if state Y
is sponsoring the NSA against state X. Should force be used
within the territorial limits of state Y or should it be kept at its
borders to maintain the sovereignty of that state? These aspects
need to be evaluated for consolidating arguments in favor of the
use of force against an NSA in state Y.
As a result, though Article 5151 approves a victim state’s
use of force in self-defense, it does not provide guidance on the
use of force against NSAs residing in a state that has no
intention of causing harm to the victim state. If a group of NSAs
launches terrorist activities from the territory of one state
against another and the NSA is not connected politically with
the host state, then there is no provision of the UN Charter that
could provide guidance on the using force against the NSA
within the territory of another state. On the other hand, another
scholarly position argues that since Article 51 approves the use
of force as a mechanism of self-defense, then force can be used
against any entity, including an NSA, that may threaten the
security of a state.52
The main contention is that if international law or the
UN Security Council permits using force against the NSA
residing or using the territory of a state that is also against the
NSA, then the use of force or a military operation against the
NSA within the territory of the host state 53 can infringe the
sovereignty of the host state. However, we must also consider
the fact that the sovereignty of the host state has already been
violated when the NSA captured some of the territory of that
state and launched terrorist activities from there against the
victim state. In such an instance, it is the inherent right of the
victim state to protect itself from the attacks waged on it from
the host state territory; 54 for this purpose of self-defense, the
victim state can also use arms against attack from the host state
territory.
Thus, in such an instance, we can infer that clearly the
use of force in self-defense by the victim state against NSAs in
another state can stand in accordance with Article 51 and thus
the action would be regarded as legitimate. The only contention
U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 8 (1945).
Evan Criddle & William Banks, Customary Constraints on The Use of
Force: Article 51 With an American Accent, 7 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 29 (2015).
53 The “host state” is the state where the NSA resides or from where the NSA
is launching terrorist attacks against the victim state.
54 U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 9.
51
52
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is the apparent violation of the sovereignty of the host state.
This makes it difficult to pronounce either state the “victim
state,” since one state is the victim of terrorist threats or attacks
from the NSA, while the second state can become the victim of
the use of force by the first in response to the attacks and
threats from the NSA.
On the other hand, if the host state does not have the
capacity to counter the threats of the NSA, then that state may
be regarded as a “weak” state. Furthermore, if such a state is
unable to firmly maintain and implement the obligations of the
international treaties within its territory and is unable to secure
its territory from being captured by NSAs, then the weak state
can be declared a “failed” state.55
Furthermore, a political or institutional vacuum there can
lead to the involuntary collapse of that state and, consequently,
can make it a safe haven for the NSA to launch more attacks on
the victim state.56 To counter such a possibility, and to defend
itself from such attacks, we can infer that the victim state
should use force against the NSA within the territory that may
originally have been part of the weak or failed state but is now
controlled by the NSA. In this regard, the aforementioned
situation cannot be regarded as equivalent to when the host
state has the ability to regain control of its lost territory from
the NSA as in that situation the host state cannot be regarded
as a weak or failed state. However, the UN Charter does not
provide
any
explanation
or
recommendation
of
a
countermeasure for a situation where the host state is
overlooking the existence of the NSA and is neglecting the
threat posed by the NSA to another state or if it is also reluctant
or unwilling to take severe action against the NSA.
2.

The Use of Force and Self-Defense

Such an act of using force in order to preserve self-defense
can be explained in the following lines, as stated by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ):57
The right of self-defence is a right to use force to avert an
attack. The source of the attack, whether a State or a

DAMIEN KINGSBURY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 169 (2007).
Id.
57 LOUISE ARIMATSU, MICHAEL SCHMITT, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW – 2010 20 (2011).
55
56

16:1

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

14

non-state actor, is irrelevant to the existence of the
right.58

Consequently, force can also be used within the territory of the
host state where the NSA is safely residing in and controlling a
portion of territory. The host state would be targeted if it is
neither willing nor able to take serious action against the NSA,
because an unwilling state is considered to be cooperating with
the NSA, whereas the inability of the host state brands it a
failed state that can disrupt international peace by becoming a
safe haven for terrorists. In this regard, force, i.e., the military
operations, against such rogue states or against the NSA must
not harm the general population in that state.
3.

Individual and Collective Self-Defense

The Preamble to the UN Charter demonstrates its resolve
to uphold fundamental human rights. 59 The International
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil
and Political Rights, along with the International Bill of Rights,
encompass contemporary principles of human rights. These are
supplemented by regional treaties and conventions, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950.60 Human rights
lawyers in the recent past have increasingly tried to enforce
human rights laws on armed action, although traditionally
international humanitarian law has been used to limit the
excesses of war.
In addition to customary law on self-defense, Article 51 of
the UN Charter is the most important provision that endorses
individual as well as collective self-defense.61 It grants modern
states the right to respond with force to any breach of their
security. 62 The right to self-defense can be invoked both in
response to an actual armed attack and also in retaliation to the
threat of an imminent attack 63 —the latter is referred to as
anticipatory self-defense.
WILLIAM C. BANKS, COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 263 (2013); see also JACQUES-YVAN MORIN & SIENHO
YEE, MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 465 (2009).
59 See generally U.N. Charter (1945).
60 See generally, Eur. Convention on Human Rights (1950).
61 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 317 (2002).
62 U.N. Charter art. 5.
63 Christian Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20:2 EUR. J. INT’L L.
359, 359-360 (2009).
58
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More significantly, states have the right to collective selfdefense, which is “the sum of individual rights to self-defense in
a scenario where threats to a state’s security are linked to those
of another.” 64 Collective self-defense can be exercised in a
scenario where a “proximate relationship” exists between the
self-defense of two or more entities.65 Collective security is one of
the fundamental principles66 upon which the UN Charter rests
its prohibition of force and its encouragement of the peaceful
settlement of disputes.67 Enforcement operations involving the
use of force can be authorized by the Security Council to target a
specific state or entity. 68 These entities may range from a
government to an armed group that possesses territory.
IV.

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a doctrine that
implies that states have the essential responsibility to protect
their population from every kind of threats, whether crossborder invasion or intra-state conflict.69 The underlying purpose
is to assure peace and security to the general population;
however, if the state fails to do so owing to its inability or
unwillingness to protect the public, then the responsibility falls
to the international community to be responsible for protecting
the population of that state.70 This doctrine was presented by
the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.71
Furthermore,
R2P
also
endorses
humanitarian
intervention in a situation where the citizens of a state are
facing violations of human rights and the state is unable or
unwilling to eliminate harm to the citizens. 72 In such a
GABRIELA MARIA KUTTING,
TO GLOBAL ISSUES 40 (2009).
64

CONVENTIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER RESPONSES

Tams, supra note 63.
CHIE KOJIMA & RUDIGER WOLFRUM, SOLIDARITY: A STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (2010); see also: KUTTING, supra note 64, at 40.
67 ANN KARIN LARSSEN & DAG HENRIKSEN, POLITICAL RATIONALE AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN LIBYA 248 (2016).
68 Id.
69 JOHN DAVIS, THE ARAB SPRING AND ARAB THAW 61-86 (2016).
70 DUBRAVKA ZARKOV & HELEN HINTJENS, CONFLICT, PEACE, SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES 238 (2014).
71 Id.; see also DANIEL SILANDER & DON WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SYRIA 19 (2015).
72 GUNTHER HELLMANN, JUSTICE AND PEACE 29 (2013); see also INGRID
DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 110 (2016).
65 See
66
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situation, R2P assigns responsibility to other states and
international organizations to violate the sovereignty of the
unable or unwilling state in order to protect the civilians from
facing human rights violations and further harm.73
In this section of the paper, we will analyze the legality of
the R2P doctrine and the reactionary stance of the international
community to the application of R2P, as some scholars largely
accept it, while others apply limits to it.
A.

Strong R2P

The R2P doctrine is regarded as “Strong R2P” when
states consider it without seeking approval from the UN
Security Council to use force within the territory of a state that
is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from harm. The fact
that the approval from the UNSC is not required is actually
based on the consequence when one or more members of the
Security Council vetoes the use of force against a state and the
Security Council is unable to decide or approve the legitimacy of
the use of force. 74 Therefore, to avert such a dependency, the
Strong R2P notion is suggested. Such an action has been
exercised by states by using the collective self-defense or
collective humanitarian interventions procedures.75
B.

Limited R2P

After the instigation of Strong R2P, many states and
scholars opposed it, leading to the adoption of the Limited R2P
notion. This concept rejects any use of force by states without
the approval of the Security Council.76 Moreover, it also requires
states to present first the legal, pragmatic, and authentic
justification for force within a state. 77 Furthermore, it also
applies limits to the categories of harm that may be regarded to
invoke R2P.
C.

Norms of the R2P Doctrine

See ZARKOV & HINTJENS, supra note 70; see also DETTER, supra note 72, at
110.
74 AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION 125 (2013).
75 See THOMAS G. WEISS, MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERACTIONS: HUMANITARIAN
CRISES AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 209 (2005).
76 VESSELIN POPOVSKI, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN SECURITY 213 (Aland
Hunter & Malcom McIntosh eds., 2010).
77 See WEISS, supra note 75.
73
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In addition to the formation of the Strong and Limited
R2P doctrines, there are two norms found within the R2P
framework. These are the “Prescriptive norm” and the
“Permissive norm.”

1.

Prescriptive Norm

This norm within the R2P framework urges states to use
force within a state where the civilians are facing human rights
violations,78 and actually approves intervention as obligatory in
this situation.79 The word “prescriptive” has been used for this
norm because it actually associates the use of force as a
prescription for human rights violations in a state that has
failed to protect its citizens from harm.80
2.

Permissive Norm

This norm is related to the permission to use force within
the territory of a state to protect its citizens from human rights
violations. This norm makes it mandatory for states to get
approval from the UN Security Council.81 This norm is related to
the Limited R2P doctrine and it is favored by most states and
scholars. Although this norm approves the importance of
collective intervention within the territory of a state where
civilians are facing human rights violations, it suggests that the
use of force or military operations should be the last option and
other peaceful options ought to be attempted before applying
it.82 This norm was also endorsed by former Secretary-General
of the UN Kofi Annan in the 2005 World Summit.83
The international community has largely favored and
accepted the Limited R2P and Permissive norm instead of
ADEMOLA ABASS, COMPLETE INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 409 (2014).
79 PHILIPP KASTNER, LEGAL NORMATIVITY IN THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICT 102 (2015); see also Jonah Eaton, An Emerging Norm Determining the Meaning and Legal Status of the Responsibility to Protect, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 801 (2011).
80 Jonah Eaton, An Emerging Norm - Determining the Meaning and Legal
Status of the Responsibility to Protect, MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 770 (2011).
81 DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE 4(H) INTERVENTION 141-143 (2011).
82 See ABASS, supra note 78, at 409.
83 Id. at 408.
78
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endorsing the Strong R2P and Prescriptive norm.84 Therefore, to
use force within the territory of a state for a just cause,
permission has to be given by the UN Security Council in order
to satisfy the permissive norm of R2P.85
D.

Responsibilities of a Sovereign State

The idea of sovereign responsibilities was universally
accepted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
194886 and it has much in common with R2P.87 The sovereign
responsibilities idea implies that every state has the
responsibility to protect its population from human rights
violations, ethnic conflicts and cleansing, and severe crimes. 88
Moreover, it is also an essential responsibility of states to
protect their population’s freedom and fundamental human
rights.89
The International Law Commission added more
implications to the notions of sovereign responsibilities and
published the additions with the new title of “Responsibility of
States.”90 According to the International Law Commission, the
concept of state responsibility implies that a state is responsible
for the actions, and their consequences, of every individual or
group residing within its territory and acting on its behalf of or
with its support. 91 This implies that a state will be held
responsible for terrorist attacks that NSAs launch from its
territory against another sovereign state, if it is sponsoring their
activities. Moreover, if the state is harboring terrorism it will be,
in fact, a violator of the sovereignty of the victim state against
which the terrorists are launching attacks. Therefore, the victim
state has the inherent right to use force in self-defense to

See KUWALI, supra note 81, at 141–43.
Id.
86 RODNEY BRUCE HALL, REDUCING ARMED VIOLENCE WITH NGO GOVERNANCE
21 (2013); see also LUKE GLANVILLE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: A NEW HISTORY 167 (2013).
87 PAUL JACKSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
378 (2015).
88 ERIC PATTERSON & JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH
COMPANION TO MILITARY ETHICS 90 (2016).
89 GLANVILLE, supra note 86, at 167.
90 See Articles on Responsibility for State for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
91 Id.
84
85
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counter such a threat92 and force is justifiable and in accordance
with international law.93
However, the situation becomes complicated when the
state is not harboring terrorism and the NSAs are acting
independently to cause harm to another state. There are two
alternatives here. The first is that the state is willing and able
to dismantle the terrorist activities of the NSAs residing in its
territory; the second is that the state is willing but unable to do
so. In both situations, it is the explicit responsibility of the state
to take effective measures to eliminate the terrorist threats from
its territory. Let us consider the situation in Syria as an
illustration of the responsibility of the state and the use of force.
We can apply these two situations to Syria.
Here, in the first alternative, i.e., if the Syrian state has
the ability to counter the terrorist activities, then it must use
force by launching military operations against ISIS NSAs within
its territorial limits and borders, and it must ensure that its
steps are concrete enough to override the threats from ISIS. In
such an event, the use of force by the victim state, i.e., the
United States and EU countries, on the basis of self-defense is
not required because the host state, i.e., the Syrian government,
would already be acting on behalf of the victim state in selfdefense. However, unfortunately, this is not the reality as the
Syrian government has not cooperated with the United States,
or with other states that have been victims of ISIS. Although the
Syrian government has repeatedly confirmed that it wants to
eliminate the threat of ISIS from the region, it has not been able
to do so.94
This leads to the second alternative, i.e., if the Syrian
state is unable to control its territory from being used by ISIS,
then this creates a difficult situation that makes it tricky to
authorize the use of force against it. Some scholars even argue
that it is unreasonable to declare a state responsible for terrorist
actions that it is neither doing nor aiding;95 therefore, launching
an attack against that state would be deemed an attack against
the sovereignty of that state.
Furthermore, the actual situation here is that the
territory of that state, i.e., Syria, is exploited by the NSA for
launching terrorist attacks against another state, and therefore
See DOUGLAS LOVELACE & KRISTEN BOON, TERROR-BASED INTERROGATION
100 (2010).
93 See id.
94 BRYAN FREDERICK, DAVID STEBBINS, OMAR AL-SHAHERY, & WILLIAM
YOUNG, SPILLOVER FROM THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 43 (2014).
95 WHITE, supra note 44, at 41.
92
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this suggests that the sovereignty of that state has already been
infringed by the NSA. 96 Here, again, the question arises:
whether the Syrian state—which is unable in terms of economic
or weaponry infrastructure to counter the NSA—should be
considered responsible for the attacks. 97 The questions arise
here are what action would be recommended for the victim state
for its self-defense? Should it use force against the state from
which the terrorist attacks were launched? Will it violate the
sovereignty of the host state in a manner that constitutes a
violation of the international legal obligations and what
responsibility applies on the host state, i.e., Syria?
In such an event, the International Law Commission
describes the responsibility of states as:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if
the person or group of persons is in fact exercising
elements of the governmental authority in the absence or
default of the official authorities and in circumstances
such as to call for the exercise of those elements of
authority.98

This argument is relatable to the situation in Syria and
the Levant region, where ISIS has captured some territories of
Iraq and Syria and subsequently is exercising authoritative
control over these territories.99 ISIS has posed as a threat not
only to the neighboring state of Iraq, but also to the United
States and to European countries,100 where it has also launched
terrorist attacks. 101 The details of the threat from ISIS are
mentioned in the first section of this paper. These threats and
the authoritative control of ISIS in the Levant region,
accompanied by the denial by the Syrian government under
President Bashar Al-Assad of launching attacks on ISIS, creates
a situation in which Article 9 of the Responsibility of States
draft is fully applicable because the Syrian government has not
performed effective measures to eliminate the ISIS threat to
Id. at 43.
COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 40, at 122.
98 Report of the Commission to the General, Ch. 1 Art. 9 [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001.
99 JÄGERSKOG & SWAIN, supra note 3, at 23.
100 RUDENSTINE, supra note 17, at 20.
101 Filiz Göktuna Yaylaci, Mine Karakus Yetkin & Melis Karakus, Migration
and Security: Three Capitals and Three Terrorist Attacks as Reflected in the
Press, in TURKISH MIGRATION 2016 SELECTED PAPERS 280 (Eroglu et al. eds.
2016).
96
97
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other states, probably because it is unable to do so. Therefore,
the Syrian government has fulfilled neither its state
responsibility nor the international obligations to curb the
terrorist havens. 102 Furthermore, the apparent neglect by the
Syrian Government regarding the activities of ISIS has
facilitated ISIS in terms of spreading its militancy and
stronghold in the Levant region; hence, the neglect has occurred
as an indirect sponsoring of ISIS. Therefore, in accordance with
the principles of state responsibility, the Syrian state’s
government shares the responsibility for the terrorist attacks
that are organized, planned, and launched by ISIS from Syrian
territory against Syrian,103 Iraqi, and European citizens and for
threats that are generated by ISIS to the United States.
Thus, an implication can be inferred that necessitates the
use of force by the victim state in the territory of the state that
is unable to control the NSA in its territory because that state
has already failed to comply with international obligations to
prohibit terrorist organizations to take hold of its territory.
Additionally, as sovereignty of the host state has already been
violated by the NSA by taking hold of some territory of host
state, it further suggests that, if a robust military operation is
not launched against the NSA, then the NSA may penetrate
further into the territory of that state to take control of more
territory in that state. This would be harmful not only for the
unity of the host state but also for the self-defense of the victim
state. Therefore, the use of force would be justifiable and
legitimate against the NSA in that state to destroy the NSAs’
stronghold, whether the relevant military operation may harm
the government, administration, or dominion of the host state
within its territory.104
Thus, the eventual response from the victim state would
be to use its inherent right of self-defense to approve the use of
force to counter the attacks of NSAs because the host state is not
cooperating or does not have the capacity to cooperate effectively
with the victim state.105 As a consequence, here, the principle of
state responsibility, which prevents a state from violating the
territory of another state is naturally and legitimately
overshadowed and superseded by the principle of self-defense.
See Barry A. Feinstein, Combating Terrorism Through International Law,
in FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE 67 (2006).
103 SILANDER & WALLACE, supra note 71, at 197.
104 WHITE, supra note 44, at 42–43.
105 CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 57 (2010).
102
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If a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities, then it would
be considered to have failed to protect its citizens or to have
been involved in the human rights violations. This implies that,
if a state is assisted or attacked by the international community
for the purpose of safeguarding the basic human rights of its
population and protecting the population from atrocities
committed in the territory either by that state or by some NSAs,
then the sovereign responsibilities would appear to be upheld.
Therefore, sovereignty is neither desecrated nor vandalized.106
Scholars tend to agree that the protection of citizens’
fundamental human rights is of higher importance than
respecting the state’s sovereignty, and if that state is involved in
violating human rights then that state is not fulfilling its
sovereign responsibilities. Therefore, its sovereignty should not
be considered equivalent to the sovereignty of other states. 107
Therefore, force can be used to protect that state’s citizens from
harm to their fundamental human rights.108 In order to further
evaluate the legality and pragmatism associated with the use of
force against a state within its territory, we can apply the
“unwilling or unable test.”
V.

THE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TEST FRAMEWORK

The unwilling or unable test framework was presented by
Ashley Deeks in 2012 to assess the use of force in relation to the
willingness or ability of the host state to counter the threat of an
NSA.109 We have already discussed two situations, in which the
host state was either willing and able to conduct strikes against
NSAs or willing but unable to do so. Now we will evaluate the
situation when the host state is unwilling and unable to punish
the terrorist NSAs.
When a state is unwilling or unable to prevent violations
of human rights in its territory and does not protect its citizens,
or when it is either unwilling or unable to break down the safe
havens of NSAs that are launching terrorist attacks against
another state, then the “unable or unwilling test” provides a
pragmatic framework for justifying the use of force within the

Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and the Advent of Sovereignty as Responsibility,
in KOSOVO, INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 40 (Aidan Hehir ed., 2010).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 491 (2012)
106
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territory of the unwilling state against NSAs.110 Furthermore, as
mentioned in earlier sections, the state that harbors terrorist
NSAs can be dealt with by force by victim states; therefore, if a
state is unwilling to counter NSA threats, then it can be
conceived as harboring the NSA.
A.
Steps for Implementation of the Unwilling or
Unable Test
In order to devise a pragmatic framework to punish the
state that is unwilling or unable to launch attacks against the
NSA, we will analyze the following steps for implementing the
unwilling or unable test framework, which contains some
guidelines and rules for the use of force.111
1.

Consent or Collaboration

The first step of implementing the “unwilling or unable
test” is to acquire permission from the host state to use force
within its territorial grounds against the NSA.112 If permission
is granted by the host state, then the issue is resolved and there
is no need for the next steps of the test. On the other hand, if
permission is not granted, then the victim state can request that
the host state take collaborative action against the NSA in the
form of launching joint military operations against the NSA,
which would be followed according to guidelines provided by the
host state and the unable or unwilling test. 113 Such a
collaborative operation against the NSA would safeguard the
sovereignty of the host state and would adhere to the demands
of the victim state to preserve its right of self-defense.
Furthermore, such an operation would also carry a joint military
cooperation and a joint information sharing mechanism between
the states against the NSA,114 which would ensure availability
of effective information of the NSA’s safe havens, allowing both
states to destroy the safe havens permanently.

Id.; see also Dawood Ahmed, Defending Weak States Against the
"Unwilling or Unable" Doctrine of Self-Defense, 18. J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 18
(2013).
111 See Deeks, supra note 109, at 519.
112 Id.
113 Id.; see also MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2016).
114 See Deeks, supra note 109, at 520–21.
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16:1

SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

2.

24

Evaluation of Threat

It is also essential to estimate the extent of the threat,
i.e., assessing the strength of the NSA, 115 the number and
variety of weapons possessed by the NSA, the quantity of
resources owned or captured by the NSA, the number of the
NSA’s armed men, etc., as well as evaluating the geographical
terrain of the conflict, the atmospheric or climatic conditions
that may act as factors of advantage for the NSA, and the
strength of the army and weaponry infrastructure of the host
state. These are some of the aspects that are necessary for a
victim state to consider prior to launching any attack against
the NSA with or without the collaboration of the host state.116
This is because the more influential the climatic and
geographical situations in the region and the more substantive
ownership of sophisticated weapons of the NSA, the more
challenging it would be for the victim state to conclusively
launch a military operation against the NSA in the territorial
grounds of the host state, while also ensuring that no significant
harm is done to the civilians of the host state during the launch
of the operation.
In this regard, a collaborative joint operation would prove
to be more effective because the host state would be providing
guidelines and sharing information with the victim state to face
the geographical, climatic, and other innate factors of the region
properly, as well as to avoid populated regions to prevent
casualties of local civilians.117
3.

Request to the Host State

The victim state can also request that the host state
unilaterally take action against the NSA in its territory.118 Such
a request can be made by the victim state in a situation where
the host state rejects the request for a joint military operation
against the NSA and does not grant permission for the victim
state to use force against the NSA unilaterally; this would
indicate the relevant unwillingness or inability of the host state
to counter the threat posed by the NSA to the victim state.119 If
the host state accepts the request from the victim state to carry
Id.; see also ROSCINI, supra note 113, at 85.
See Deeks, supra note 109, at 521.
117 Id.
118 CHIA-JUI CHENG, A NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 81 (2016).
119 See Deeks, supra note 109, at 521.
115
116
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out the operation against the NSA on its own, then it will
preserve its territorial sovereignty as well as eliminate the
threats of the NSA. 120 Moreover, such a situation would be
beneficial for the continuation of friendly bilateral relations
between the victim and host state.
On the other hand, if the host state again rejects the
request of the victim state to launch operation against the NSA,
then such a noncooperative stance would be taken by the
international community as an indication that the host state is
harboring terrorist NSAs within its territory. Furthermore, the
victim state should also give the host state a reasonable amount
of time to decide about the request of the victim state to use
force within the host state’s territory against the NSA.121 If this
is done, the request from the victim state to use force against
the NSA within the host state’s territorial limits would be
considered justified and legitimate.
4.

Evaluation of the Host State’s Capability

It is also essential for the victim state to analyze the
capabilities of the host state in measuring and countering the
threats posed by the NSA. 122 In this regard, the capabilities
should be judged in both situations, i.e., when the host state has
agreed to a joint military operation against the NSA and when it
has adopted the stance to counter the threat unilaterally. In
both situations, the victim state needs to consider whether the
host state has the adequate military capacity in terms of
sophisticated weaponry infrastructure and adequately trained
military to counter the threat from the NSA effectively. If the
capacity is lacking, then the victim state can provide assistance
to the host state in meeting the deficiencies in countering the
NSA threat.
In most situations, the host state may not reveal its
military incapacities openly because doing so would tarnish the
international reputation of their military strength. In such a
circumstance, the victim state would need to collect accurate
information about the military capabilities of the host state in
countering the NSA threat on its own and then choose either to
convince the host state to let the victim state join the operation

Id. at 523.
Id. at 525.
122 Id.; see also ROSCINI, supra note 113, at 85.
120
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against the NSA or to launch it unilaterally according to its own
military planning and weaponry capacities.123
5.

Anticipation of Means to Use Force

Prior to launching any military operation against the
NSA for self-defense, the victim state needs to first evaluate and
finalize the arrangements, i.e., the adequate means to counter
the threat.124 In this regard, the victim state must choose the
means to use force reasonably and justifiably so that its actions
will not be regarded as aggressions on the soil of the host
state.125 To gain the support of the international community for
its decision to use force, the victim state can also share its
proposed means to counter the NSA threat with the world by
either publicly announcing them in a codified manner or
through diplomatic channels. 126 For instance, some of the
anticipated means might be by targeted aerial bombardments on
terrorist safe havens or by conducting ground operations to
track down terrorists and capture them alive to interrogate
them about the source of their financial and weaponry support.
6.

Consideration of Former Interactions

The victim state’s former interactions with the host state
also play an important role in finalizing arrangements for
cooperation between the victim state and the host state.127 That
is, if there has been a history of hostility between the host state
and the victim state, which has caused hostile interactions in
the past, then the chances of cooperation between the two states
are slight.
In contrast, a common history of collaborative interactions
will most probably facilitate effective cooperation for joint
information sharing and launching joint use of force against the
NSA in the territory of the host state. Therefore, the victim state
needs to consider the historical interactions before making a
request to the host state for use of force in its territory;128 that
is, the victim state needs to utilize more diplomatic channels,
i.e., bilateral peaceful dialogues or interactions of the leaders of
Id.
See Deeks, supra note 109, at 529.
125 Id. at 531.
126 Id.
127 See Ahmed, supra note 110, at 17.
128 Id.
123
124
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both states on international public forums or at bilateral public
events to initiate a cordial atmosphere between the two states,
and then, eventually, convince the host state to agree to the use
of force against the NSA in its territory. This would neutralize
the effects of past hostile interactions between the two states
and would urge them to cooperate and act mutually against the
NSA.
On the other hand, in the aftermath of failure of
utilization of diplomatic efforts, the victim state can publicly
make requests to the host state to either use force unilaterally
or accept the request for a joint operation in collaboration with
the victim state against the NSA. If the host state agrees to
neither request, then the victim state can get support from the
international community regarding its stance to use force
against the NSA for self-defense in the light of the unwilling or
unable position shown by the host state to cooperate with the
victim state.129 The eventual international support will endorse
the use of force against the NSA as legitimate.130
These six steps of the unwilling or unable test enable the
victim state to use force in a reasonable and justified manner.
Moreover, these steps also urge the host state to decide
pragmatically to take up arms against the NSA within its own
territory and set out the criteria to judge the unwillingness or
inability of the host state to counter the NSA threat. These steps
also discourage the victim state from using force unilaterally
without acquiring permission from the host state or without the
support of the international community. Owing to their
pragmatic, justified, and rationale approach, these steps have
been molded into a single framework for the implementation of
the unable or unwilling test in an armed conflict between a
victim state and NSAs.
B.

Historical Roots of the Test

The historical roots of the unwilling or unable test can be
found in the law of neutrality, which is considered a universally
established principle. 131 The law of neutrality was first
introduced in 1907 in the Hague Convention in order to create a
See Deeks, supra note 109, at 531.
See Ahmed, supra note 110, at 28–29.
131 See Michael W. Lewis, & Peter Margulies, Interpretations of IHL in
Tribunals of the United States, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES 415, 431 (Derek Jinks et al.
eds., 2014); see also: Deeks, supra note 109, at 483.
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framework for states to remain neutral in a regional or
international armed conflict. 132 This law has become an
essential component of customary international law,133 and it is
also included in the military guidelines and rules of Belgium,
Switzerland, Canada, the United States, and the United
Kingdom. 134 Under this law, for a state to stay neutral, its
territorial grounds must not facilitate a regional or international
armed conflict. 135 To explain this, we can assert that the
territory of the neutral state must not be used for such armed
activities that may promote or demote the armed conflict in any
manner, i.e., the territory must not allow the transportation of
weapons or armed men of any party to the conflict, and must not
facilitate or allow any party to launch attacks from its territory
or from the border of its territory against any party to the
conflict.136
It is pertinent to mention here that the neutrality
principle inherent in the neutrality law urges the neutral state
to take strict action if any party, notably a NSA, crosses into its
territory and attempts to use its territory to launch armed
attacks against a party to the conflict.137 In such an event, if the
neutral state does not prevent, say, NSAs to launch an attack
against, say, a victim state, then the neutrality of the state
would be suspected to be biased and favoring the NSAs over the
victim state.138 The neutrality of the state would also be at risk
if the NSAs strengthened their existence by either acquiring
armed support from factions within the neutral state, by gaining
supplies of food or financial assistance from the neutral state, or
by using the territory of the neutral state to transport weapons
etc. In order to preserve its neutrality, the state would be
STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 194
(2005); see also MAARTJE ABBENHUIS, AN AGE OF NEUTRALS 3 (2014); see also
Yves Sandoz, Rights, Powers, and Obligations of Neutral Powers Under the
Conventions, in THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 85, 89
(Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta, & Marco Sassòli eds., 2015).
133 Sanoz, supra note 132, at 89; see also ABBENHUIS, supra note 132, at 3.
134 ROB MCLAUGHLIN, UNITED NATIONS NAVAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE
TERRITORIAL SEA 174 (2009); see also ABBENHUIS, supra note 132, at 4.
135 Emanuele Salerno, Stare Pactis and Neutrality, in WAR, TRADE AND
NEUTRALITY: EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND
EIGHTEEN CENTURIES 188, 188 (Francongeli ed., 2011).
136 Sarah Radin, The Current Relevance of the Recognition of Belligerency, in
ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN FACE
115, 148 (Brigit Toebes, Marcel Brus, & Mariëlle Matthee eds., 2013).
137 Paul Seger, The Law of Neutrality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 248, 249 (Andrew Clapham & Paola
Gaeta ed., 2015).
138 See Radin, supra note 136, at 148.
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required to prevent the NSAs from taking control of its territory
and from launching attacks against the victim state.139
On the other hand, if the neutral state is unwilling or
unable to prevent the NSAs from launching attacks against the
victim state from within its territory, then the state will no
longer be regarded as neutral as its presence benefits the NSA
and harms the victim state facing the terrorist attacks launched
from the territory of the (so-called) neutral state.140 In such a
situation, the unwilling or unable test becomes relevant and can
be applied by the victim state to uphold its right of self-defense
and to curb the bilateral, regional, and global threat from the
NSA.
C.

Proposed Goals of the Test

Ashley Deeks suggested three goals of the unwilling or
unable test.141 The first is to limit the use of force by the victim
state so that it is used only as a last resort. This also implies
that other peaceful options for cooperating with the host state
must be tried by the victim state prior to settling on using force
in the territory of the host state. The second goal is to clarify
how force is to be used and the victim state’s plan of action so as
to garner support from the international community for the
justified means of use of force and to avert any allegation by the
host state that the victim state used illegal weaponry, e.g.,
chemical weapons, as the means of force.142
The third and most important goal of the test is to
establish a set of rules and criteria through which the victim
state and the host state can decide on the use of force against
the NSAs within the territory of the host state.143 This will pave
the way toward acceptance of the unwilling or unable test as a
standard for the use of force in an armed conflict.
D.

Application of the Test and the ISIS Crisis

As mentioned earlier, ISIS has posed a great threat to the
United States, European countries, and neighboring Islamic
countries in the Middle East. To the United States, it has given
verbal threats that amount to a breach of the sovereignty and
Id.; see also Seger, supra note 137.
Id.
141 See Deeks, supra note 109, at 489.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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safety of the United States. In response, the United States has
to perform a preliminary action for its self-defense before too
much time passes and ISIS becomes successful in its plans to
launch attacks on the United States.144 However, because ISIS
resides in Syrian territory and nearby lands, if the United
States uses force against ISIS it will automatically enter Syrian
territory.
Thus, according to the principles defined in the
responsibilities of state mentioned above in Section 2, Syrian
sovereignty has already been breached by ISIS, and in response
the Syrian government has been unable or unwilling to take
back the land captured by ISIS. Therefore, it has also not
fulfilled its sovereign responsibilities as its neglect over ISIS
presence in Syria and the Levant is strengthening ISIS, as
explained in Section 2 of this paper.
Moreover, as illustrated above, the Syrian government
has also been unable or unwilling to counter or mitigate the
threat generated by ISIS or to protect its citizens from becoming
victims of human rights violations by ISIS. Many Syrian people
have been killed by ISIS, and young girls have been kidnapped
by ISIS members.145 Thus, the Syrian state has been unable to
fulfill its “responsibility to protect” its citizens,146 which implies
that the responsibility now falls to the international community
to protect the innocent civilians of Syria and of the bordering
Levant region. In this situation, we will first apply the unwilling
or unable test to justify the use of force by the United States
against ISIS in Syrian territory.
The first step of the unwilling or unable test is to require
consent from the host state,147 and here the United States has
not asked for the consent of the host state, i.e., Syria. 148
Recently, the Syrian government has expressed stern
disapproval and has strictly opposed the use of force by the
United States in Syrian territory.149 In 2014, statements from
some Syrian ministers, including Foreign Minister Waleed AlSee Sliney, supra note 31.
ADDULLAHI ALAZREG, ISIS: MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY 149 (2016).
146 DEBRA L. DELAET, The Global Struggle for Human Rights: UNIVERSAL
PRINCIPLES IN WORLD POLITICS 222 (2014).
147 See Deeks, supra note 109, at 520–21.
148 Jean d’Aspremont, The Decay of Modern Customary International Law in
Spite of Scholarly Heroism, in THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 2014 10 (Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo
ed., 2015).
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Moallem were interpreted by the United States as expressing
tacit consent for the United States’ use of force against ISIS in
Syrian territory,150 but the contemporary nature of hostility and
censure expressed by the Syrian government over the use of
force by the United States in Syrian territory has negated all
previous, incorrect interpretations and has confirmed that there
has been no consent granted by the Syrian government to the
United States. 151 This implies that the Syrian government is
unwilling to collaborate with the United States over using force
against ISIS NSAs in Syrian and Levant territory. This leads us
to the second step of the unwilling or unable test.
The second step is to assess the ISIS threat and its
contemporary implications, which the United States has
evaluated to a great extent, inducing it to deploy its resources to
launch a remote military operation against ISIS. 152 However,
scholars argue that the United States ignored the ISIS threat to
a great extent in 2014–15, when ISIS took hold of the Levant
region.153 Furthermore, the United States has not assessed the
threat with precision, which is the reason behind the current
persistent spread of the ISIS NSA organization.154 For instance,
the United States’ estimates of the number of ISIS group
members were seven times lower than they are at the present.155
An accurate assessment of the threat is required in order to
create an effective plan to counter and terminate the threat
permanently.
The third step is to request that the host state counter the
threat.156 The United States has already requested on numerous
occasions that the Syrian government use force against ISIS, but
somehow the Syrian government has been unable to use force
effectively to terminate the threatening existence of ISIS in the
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region.157 This leads to the fourth step of the unable or unwilling
test, which is related to assessing the military capabilities of the
Syrian state. 158 The United States has estimated the difficult
nature of countering the ISIS threat and therefore it has
maintained that the Syrian government will not be able to deal
with such a threat. Therefore, it has decided to use force against
ISIS.159
The fifth step is to finalize the means to counter the ISIS
threat.160 The United States is using air combat as a means to
launch attacks on ISIS camps.161 However, the effectiveness of
these air strikes is debatable as they have not resulted in ending
the ISIS threat, probably because the strikes have not been
robust so far.162 Ground-based military operations have not been
launched by the United States Army so far owing to the complex
nature of the ISIS threat. The United States has kept track of
ISIS strongholds and has launched attacks by drone or jet
fighter planes carrying missiles. It has also supported anti-ISIS
groups, i.e., Kurdish militants and the coalition forces of
European countries, militarily against ISIS.163
The sixth and final step of the unwilling or unable test is
to evaluate the former interactions of the United States with the
Syrian state. Unfortunately, the past interactions between the
states, particularly during the presidency of Bashar Al-Assad
and his family, have not been cordial. 164 Under the Assad
regime, Syria has shown more political inclination toward
Russia by becoming its ally alongside Iran and thus contributing
toward a polarization in the Middle Eastern region that
expresses an antagonistic posture toward the United States,
particularly on the Syrian side.165 Furthermore, historically, the
Syrian state was in the Soviet bloc against the United States
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during the Cold War.166 Additionally, the Arab–Israeli conflicts
after 1967 and during the 1970s provoked the hostility of Syria
against Israel and its ardent supporter, the United States. 167
Such hostile past interactions discourage a collaboration
between the states over the ISIS threat.
The aforementioned steps and their inferences imply that
the unwilling or unable test fully applies to the armed conflict
between ISIS and the United States. The United States can use
force against ISIS in self-defense. However, it also needs to
acquire consent from the Syrian government to use force against
ISIS in Syrian territory168 according to the unwilling or unable
test framework 169 and in order to legitimize its use of force
according to the principles of international law related to an
armed conflict.170 Curbing the ISIS threat is in the interest of
not only the United States and European nations, but also the
Syrian government, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries in
ISIS’s neighborhood, because the ISIS has posed a horrendous
threat to all of these regions.171 Furthermore, the United States
should properly assess the ISIS threat in order to devise an
effective strategy for countering as well as terminating the
threat permanently.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from history that the international
community responds to a regional or international armed
conflict in a multifaceted and unclear manner. 172 That is, the
international community criticizes the use of force by one state
in the territory of another. Such force is an apparent breach of
territorial sovereignty of the host state when the military
actions by the victim state are launched against NSAs in the
territory of the host state and when the host state has not given
express and open consent to the victim state to use force in its
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territory.173 This weakens support for the stance of the victim
state. As a result, its right of self-defense would appear to be at
stake, despite this right having been recognized by Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.
Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention here that modern
technology can also help NSAs to grow stronger174 because it can
assist NSAs to act in a more organized manner; for instance,
using fast communication tools, 175 the Internet, sophisticated
weaponry, location trackers, and other technological tools176 can
help them strategically to hold their presence for a longer time.
NSAs that are more advanced in military capacity as well
as in organization can capture natural resources and can use
them for financial support. For instance, ISIS has captured the
oil wells near the Iraq and Syrian borders177 and has allegedly
been found to be earning around a million dollars a day from
exporting oil to some countries.178 The seizure of such resources
can make NSAs, like ISIS, grow stronger and states, like Syria,
grow relatively weaker when their territory is captured by
NSAs; therefore, the nature of the ISIS threat is getting
stronger. Consequently, in a situation where NSAs are growing
stronger and are generating threats to states globally, but the
international community remains undecided about approving
the use of force against them, there can arise the possibility of
victim states indulging in proxy wars in host states.179
As it is the inherent right of the victim state to use force
in its self-defense,180 the victim state may choose to act either by
launching a direct attack against NSAs within the territory of a
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host state or by punishing them through another NSA group
that may not be officially identified as having associations with
the victim state. In either case, the victim state would be using
force to exercise its inherent right of self-defense. However, such
a situation would cause severe damage to the peace and stability
of the region, particularly in a situation when the victim state
chooses to act surreptitiously by supporting a NSA group to fight
against another NSA group threatening the security of the
victim state from within the host state’s territory. Moreover, it
may also lead to severe human rights violations in which local
civilians might also face significant harm, because NSAs do not
follow any obligations of international law, despite the fact that
the UN Charter and customary international law applies to
them. 181 Furthermore, any of the two fighting NSAs may
attempt to create a state of its own in the territory captured and
controlled by it.182
Thus, the main concern is that a divorce between
international law and contemporary reality is harmful and
becomes imminent in the aforementioned armed conflict, which
can convince the victim states to use subversive means to
respond in order to preserve their self-defense. These concerns
are compelling because international law does not provide
guidance particularly in the event of an armed conflict between
a state and an NSA residing in another sovereign state;
furthermore, there are no particular laws but only inferences
from the principles of international law that can suggest or
endorse possible reactions for preserving victim states’ right of
self-defense. Such a situation can impel victim states to behave
outside their legal obligations when they do not find any part of
international law favoring their self-defense stance. Hence,
ignoring the problems such as armed conflict between a state
and an NSA in another state can cause ambiguousness in
international law and, at times, can lead to its disregard by the
international community, which may choose to act outside the
law to safeguard their self-defense or to protect their interests.
There is an urgent need for international law to evolve in
a manner that would provide effective and pragmatic
regulations covering all kinds of conflicts and issues, whether
between states or between a state and an NSA. Furthermore,
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2014).
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international armed conflicts should be regulated in relation to
addressing the sovereignty of the states involved in the conflict.
Finally, international law also needs to provide effective and
pragmatic recommendations for dealing with weak or failed
states in such a manner that protects their sovereignty,
particularly for those states that are directly or indirectly
involved in an armed conflict. Such guidelines, if provided,
would result in protecting the sovereignty of states from
infringement by NSAs like ISIS.

